Greer Mellon : Discretion Under Pressure: How Superintendents Allocate Educational Resources

Economic Sociology Seminar presentation by Greer Mellon, Brown University, Population Studies and Training Center.

• Abstract: In the United States, local bureaucrats often make resource allocation decisions, but their decisions are constrained by state and federal policies which provide external accountability pressure. Whether such pressure reinforces inequality through risk-averse spending or promotes redistributive investment remains an open question. In this paper, we examine how bureaucrats respond to external pressure through a novel interactive survey experiment with school district superintendents - the chief executive officers of local school systems in the United States.  In the experiment, superintendents allocate a large funding increase, and we randomly vary exposure to state accountability pressure to improve student achievement. We find that external pressure increases support for inequality-reducing investments such as early childhood education, after-school tutoring, and support for students with disabilities. However, administrators consistently favor income-based over race-based redistribution, and accountability pressure does not increase support for race-targeted spending. Even absent pressure, superintendents prioritize investments in inequality-reducing programs. Preferences are largely consistent across districts, but vary by institutional context, including achievement levels, fiscal dependence, and labor costs. These findings show bureaucratic discretion is not inherently unequal, and institutional environments and accountability pressures can shape administrators’ support toward redistributive investments for some, but not all, traditionally underserved student groups.